Generating Procedural Controls to Facilitate Trade: The Role of Control in the Absence of Trust by W.H. Bons, Roger et al.
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
BLED 2012 – Special Issue BLED Proceedings
Summer 6-2012
Generating Procedural Controls to Facilitate Trade:
The Role of Control in the Absence of Trust
Roger W.H. Bons
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands, r.w.h.bons@vu.nl
Ronald M. Lee
Florida International University, Miami, USA, leerm@fiu.edu
Vu Hoang Nguyen
Economics University, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, vu.nguyen.1128@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/bled2012_special_issue
This material is brought to you by the BLED Proceedings at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in BLED 2012 – Special
Issue by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
W.H. Bons, Roger; M. Lee, Ronald; and Nguyen, Vu Hoang, "Generating Procedural Controls to Facilitate Trade: The Role of Control
in the Absence of Trust" (2012). BLED 2012 – Special Issue. 10.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/bled2012_special_issue/10
25th Bled eConference 
Special Issue 
June 17 - 20, 2012; Bled, Slovenia 
 
Generating Procedural Controls to Facilitate Trade: 
The Role of Control in the Absence of Trust 
Roger W.H. Bons 
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
r.w.h.bons@vu.nl 
Ronald M. Lee 
Florida International University, Miami, USA 
leerm@fiu.edu 
Vu Hoang Nguyen 
Economics University, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam 
vu.nguyen.1128@gmail.com 
Abstract 
Over the years, Trust has been recognized in the Bled community as a key enabling factor to 
stimulate Electronic Commerce. Authors have discussed formal aspects of trust, the role trust 
plays in the adoption of both B2B and B2C Electronic Commerce, as well as mechanisms to 
build trust and/or overcome the lack of it. This article first provides a brief overview of the 
Trust-related articles in the Bled eConference. It then focuses on one specific aspect of the 
facilitation of trade in absence of trust: the development of procedural controls that enable 
Electronic Commerce at arms’ length, summarizing the contributions of the authors on this 
theme at the Bled Conference since the early 1990s. The paper concludes with the authors’ 
current view on developing procedural controls, focusing on the design process itself, which 
is often a rather lengthy process consisting of trial-and-error. Here a more analytical 
approach is proposed to the identification of control requirements for inter-organizational 
procedures. The approach involves abstracting the process to identify its basic deontic 
elements. A model checking approach is then applied to identify needed controls. 
Keywords: Trust, control, inter-organizational procedure, trade facilitation, deontic process, 
electronic contracting 
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1 Introduction: Trust at the Bled Conference 
The topic of “Trust” started to appear in 1994 in the Bled community, when Allan Gillman 
discussed the “socio political dimensions of EDI trading relationships” (Gillman, 1994). He 
draws (tentative) conclusions that a properly functioning EDI link will increase the level of 
trust among trading-partners. However, while many articles until that time had discussed 
factors of EDI adoption, the concept of “trust” had not really been addressed. In retrospect, 
this might be due to the fact that EDI was (and is) seen as something between existing trading 
partners who either have a pre-existing business partnership (valuable enough to bear the high 
investments in the EDI link) or have an asymmetric power relationship where one can force 
the other to comply.  
This changed when, within and outside the Bled community, the topic of “EDI” was more and 
more being encompassed by the wider definitions of electronic business, electronic 
commerce, and e-marketplaces. From a strictly business-to-business setting, the consumer 
came into the picture, leading to a whole new range of topics and researchers, including the 
most recent inclusion of social media. The factor “trust” became increasingly more in the 
focus of Bled researchers, be it as a variable in e-commerce adoption studies for SMEs and/or 
consumers, but also more fundamentally looking at enabling factors, including legal 
conditions, technological challenges, risk management approaches as well as socio-political 
considerations.  
Since 1994, about 60 papers have been published in Bled with “trust” as an important factor 
in the research presented. Some have addressed the constructs that constitute trust, while 
others have focused on the role trust plays in the adoption of e-Business / e-Commerce 
solutions and e-Marketplaces in the consumer and SME world. Another group of authors has 
focused on how to overcome a lack of trust and propose solutions in technical, legal, 
organizational/institutional and/or procedural dimensions. Table 1 shows an overview of the 
papers we identified, from the early 1990‟s until today, using three main categories: Trust 
Fundamentals, Trust as a factor in Adoption of e-Business/e-Commerce/Social Media, and 
Trust Enablers. We fully realize that this will not do full justice to the original work we have 
thus categorized and we could not avoid making some somewhat arbitrary choices, but we do 
hope that by showing the impressive body of work we can underpin the importance the Bled 
conference has had on this important topic and each individual contribution in it. 
In the “Trust Fundamentals” category, we have clustered those articles that investigate the 
phenomenon “trust” itself, in terms of definitions and measurement.  The definition of the 
term depends on the view of the respective authors and the context in which it is placed.  
When we view “trust” in the context of risk management, it can be seen as an estimated 
(subjective) probability that the counterparty will act in a predictable and agreed-upon way, or 
in other words, belief in the absence of opportunistic intentions from the counterparty. In the 
context of e-Business, trust, or rather lack of trust, becomes an inhibitor for parties 
(consumers, businesses and governments alike) to adopt new ways of doing business. 
Following this reasoning, the confidence in a good turn of events can be achieved at the level 
of the partnership itself (one trusts the good intentions of the other party).  
Alternatively, the presence of opportunistic intentions can be addressed by controlling their 
actual activities through the involvement of trusted third parties or institutions. Finally, 
specifically in the context of e-business, the medium in which the activities takes place is 
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based on technology. The additional risks associated with the use of this technology forms an 
additional factor in the overall risk assessment of the actors in the e-Business theatre. 
 





Tan et al., 1998a,  
Castleman et al., 2001,  
Tung et al., 2001,  
Christensen et al., 2002,  
Icasati-Johanson et al., 2003, 
Koch et al., 2004,  
Pucihar et al., 2005,  
Lawson et al., 2005&2007, 
Vatanasakdakul, 2008 
Institutional / Organizational: 
Lee et al., 1995,  
Bons et al., 1996&1997, 
Ganzaroli et al., 1997&1999,  
Lee, 2001a,  
Gregor et al., 2000,  
Rao et al., 2001,  
Gordijn et al., 2003,  
Kartseva et al., 2004 
 
Institutional trust: 
Ratnasingam et al., 2003, 
Hulstijn et al., 2005, 
Verhagen et al., 2005 
B2C/G2C/C2C context: 
Schubert, 1997,  
Klein et al., 1998,  
Sieber, 1999,  
Schubert et al., 1999, 
Farrell et al., 2000,  
Loebbecke et al., 2001,  
Ang et al., 2001,  
Bouwman et al., 2003, 
Jarvelainen, 2003,  
Head et al., 2003,  
Lui et al., 2003,  
Hassanein et al., 2004, 
Meents et al., 2004, 
Verhagen et al., 2004  
 
Legal / Privacy: 
Gisler et al., 1997,  
Hudoklin et al., 1997,  
Smith, 1999,  
Tan et al., 2002,  
Di Biagi, 2003,  
Jutla et al., 2003,  
Dinev et al., 2005, 
Polanski, 2005&2006, 
Clarke, 2006,  
Ong et al., 2009,  
System trust: 
Gogan et al., 2009 
General theory and 
measurement: 
Tan et al., 1999,  
Van Buuren et al., 2004, 
Burgermeestre et al., 2010, 
Schryen et al., 2010,  
Soelnner et al., 2010 
Social media context: 
Ten Kate et al., 2010,  
Mantymaki et al., 2010, 
Riemer et al., 2010 
Technology: 
Clarke, 2002,  
Ratnasingam et al., 2002 
Table 1: Overview of Trust related articles in Bled 1994-2011. 
Given these considerations, many authors have studied the impact of one or more of these 
components of trust on the adoption of e-business and more recently social media. We have 
classified the contributions into B2B/B2G versus B2C/G2B/C2C, which is a common way to 
study the e-Business / e-Commerce /e-Government fields. At the end of the day, “trust” 
always comes down to the estimation of one or more human beings and their resulting 
intentions to engage (or not). However, there is a difference between the role that trust plays if 
the individual acts in a role as “consumer” (or “patient” or “citizen”), representing him/herself 
(and/or family) versus a role as an employee or representative of an organization. In recent 
years, “social media” have been added to the equation, with their own set of dynamics due to 
the critical role that user-generated content plays in these media and the often anonymous 
nature of the individuals generating it. 
The final category of papers deal with “trust” in a constructive manner, finding ways to 
overcome a lack of trust by addressing institutional and/or organizational solutions, legal 
solutions and technological solutions. The first two categories seek solutions that can improve 
the institutional trust between parties, while the latter contributes to system trust. Institutional 
and organizational solutions introduce ways for actors to secure their activities, typically via 
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the intermediating role of trusted third parties. These parties may simply be agents that act on 
behalf of one of the actors.  However, they also include (governmental) institutions that 
regulate interactions and whose only interest is the facilitation of the transaction itself, for 
instance, through electronic marketplaces. In principle, these kind of solutions are 
preventative from a risk management perspective: they try to avoid damage occurring in the 
first place. Solutions in the legal field are usually more of a reactive nature. They will ensure 
that parties have sufficient ways to repair any damages via the legal system. Removing 
uncertainties about the position of parties after the fact is an important way to increase the 
level of confidence that, even if something goes wrong, not everything is lost. It also provides 
a negative incentive to those planning opportunistic behavior. In a social media context, but 
also in other contexts involving private individuals, a separate concern is privacy, which we 
have clustered in this domain as well. The identity of a person in combination with certain 
attributes (i.e., knowledge about one‟s preferences, whereabouts, financial data etc.) is a 
valuable asset in its own right that needs to be protected. Finally, studies in the technology 
domain look at how technical solutions can help to contribute to trust as well. Often, they are 
a consequence of solutions in the other two areas. For instance, legal solutions will typically 
require that stated intentions must be documented in such a way that courts can rule on them. 
In an electronic world, the concept of a signature was (and is) therefore an intensively 
investigated research area. With credit card fraud and identity theft on the rise, lack of 
technological solutions, their implementation and use is still a major threat to all e-Initiatives 
in scope of the Bled Conference for years to come.  
Figure 1 shows the number of articles on Trust over the years, divided into the three main 
categories. 
 
Figure 1: History of trust related articles in Bled 1994-2011 
2 Inter-organizational procedures for trade 
In the remainder of this paper, we will discuss how our work on procedural controls has 
contributed to the Trust discussion, at Bled, and in other venues. This section positions our 
work in the overall context of Trust and discusses the fundamental concepts we have based 
our research on. The next section will discuss the focus of our current research and provides 
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an outlook towards what we believe to be the next step in designing procedural controls for 
trade, particularly international trade.  
In 1994, we introduced the concept of “Open-edi” in Bled, looking at taking away the barriers 
for establishing an EDI link by reducing the set-up costs (Bons et al., 1994). We were 
convinced that the Internet would offer opportunities to engage in electronic business at a 
much wider scale, and with new trading partners with whom no prior trading relationship 
existed and trading would start at “arm‟s length”. The reduction of set-up costs was (and is) 
an important factor in this, and understanding and agreeing about the context in which 
messages are sent is a vital element therein. In fact, several international bodies such as the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) have been working on the simplification, standardization, and 
harmonization of trade rules, conventions, and procedures. Although few scientific articles 
specifically addressed trade facilitation, the theme has been discussed frequently at the Bled 
Conferences, where practitioners, scientists and regulators from the EU and the UN have met 
over the years.  
Our initial contribution to the simplification of trade procedures was to introduce a modeling 
technique, “Documentary Petri Nets” (Lee & Bons, 1995), to model the inter-organizational 
exchange of goods, funds and information. At the time, other researchers were looking into 
the modeling of inter-organizational business processes, often adopting a “Business Process 
Redesign” approach (Hammer, 1990). The research by Van Hee and Van der Aalst at the 
Eindhoven University of Technology was also looking at the use of (colored) Petri nets to 
model such processes, and was quantitative in nature (Van der Aalst & van Hee, 1996). Our 
focus was less on the computational aspects of messaging or the operational efficiency of the 
resulting processes, and more on the context in which the messages where exchanged. 
When reasoning about these “messaging contexts” (a.k.a. “Open-edi scenarios”), we started to 
realize that the function of many documents in international1 trade is not an operational one 
but is related to controlling the execution of the underlying contract. The contract specifies an 
exchange of actions, such as delivering certain goods or performing certain services (or 
sometimes refraining from taking punitive action, such as licenses, or easements) against a 
payment from the counterparty. In other words, each party does something to get something.  
We refer to these actions done for others as 'doing' tasks.  
When the principal parties do not have established trading relationships (i.e., insufficient trust 
at the partnership level) and cannot directly observe the proper execution of these „doing‟ 
tasks by the other parties in the contract, they will want confirmation from an agent that they 
do trust that the other parties have in fact acted according to their contractual obligations (i.e., 
sufficient trust at the institutional level). The activities relating to contract monitoring we call 
'control' tasks. These control activities usually involve other parties such as banks, carriers 
and inspection agencies and require documents as evidence of contractual relations (e.g. sales 
contracts, credit contracts, insurance contracts, and transport contracts), regulatory relations 
(e.g. import licenses, export licenses, and duty exemptions), and various kinds of performance 
or operational evidence relating to these contractual and regulatory relations (e.g. shipment of 
goods, payment of goods, and payment of tax). We use a similar distinction of the concepts 
                                                 
1 The theory developed can also be applied to trade within a single legal jurisdiction, but the amount of 
uncertainty due to lack of common legal frameworks, cultural differences and physical distance make the 
international domain more challenging. 
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“trust” and “control” as defined by (Das & Teng, 1998). While they both contribute to the 
same goal (“confidence in partner cooperation”), they have an “open-ended supplementary” 
relationship. If it is possible to fully trust a partner (meaning: have full confidence that the 
partner has only the best of intentions), controls are not necessary. Vice versa, if one can fully 
control the other party‟s actions, the intentions of the party no longer play a role. While Das & 
Teng focus on the long-term effects of trust and control and their interdependence, we focus 
on the early stages of the relationship when there is (still) absence of trust and a single 
transaction has to be completed in a safe and secure way. 
The obligations of all these various parties could be incorporated into a single, complex multi-
party contract. However, if things go wrong and one or more parties defaults, the question 
arises as to the residual obligations among the remaining parties (imagine a contract between 
A,B,C; A defaults; must B and C still fulfill their obligations?). For this reason, most multi-
party contracts are divided into two party contracts. Thus, the full transaction may actually 
involve a number of different sub-contracts. The trade procedure weaves all of these various 
sub-contracts together. It consists of essential activities that realize the exchange of goods, 
services, and funds between the parties, as well as other control activities that aim to limit the 
risk of fraud. The trade procedure also contains any necessary control steps to ensure that the 
contract is self-enforcing. Therefore, a large part of trade procedures involves creating and 
transferring documents -- either in paper or in digital form. 
With the Internet on the rise and Electronic Commerce becoming a reality, we asked 
ourselves the question how “electronic documents” could make international trade more 
efficient, eliminating the limitations of their paper-based equivalents. Furthermore, the 
Internet made it possible to find new business partners in a globally connected world, and we 
envisioned the need for safeguards in these starting relationships to increase. Finally, with the 
digitization of certain industries and the introduction of “micro-payments”, we felt that there 
would be the need for new control mechanisms, because the known and trusted methods may 
be too expensive to operate in these settings.  
As a consequence, our research evolved into the notion of “designing trustworthy trade 
procedures”, where we added the concept of control and risk management in situations with 
insufficient trust into the reasoning why EDI adoption was limited to “closed relationships” or 
“electronic hierarchies” (Bons et al., 1997). We introduced the notion of a “trustworthy trade 
procedure”, defined as “a trade procedure that governs a transaction in which the risk of 
opportunistic behavior by one or more parties is present but which provides sufficient inter-
organizational controls to limit this risk.” (Bons et al., 1997). Based on a set of control 
principles, derived from a combination of legal and accountancy literature, reasoning about 
the “control quality” of the trade procedure and the principles were translated into control 
patterns. Finally, we set out to automate this reasoning process. The aforementioned 
“Documentary Petri Net” formalism was used to model the dynamic aspects of the trade 
procedures. The obligations between parties were specified using a -predicate logic – at that 
stage a basic one. A pattern-matching approach was used to identify potential control 
weaknesses in a proposed procedure. A prototype implementation called “InterProcs” 
translated these patterns into audit daemons (Lee, 1998), which, when applied to example 
trade procedures, was able to show the control weaknesses and to support the design of 
procedural controls for trade procedures.  
Our research accordingly fits best into the institutional/organizational category discussed 
earlier, although there is a strong legalistic component to it, because the starting point for our 
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analysis was the obligations of parties and the contracts in which they are formalized. By the 
late 1990s, the EURIDIS institute at the Erasmus University Rotterdam, where this research 
was done, was intensively looking at the various aspects of trust and control under the 
leadership of Ronald Lee. Its researchers have had a significant mark on the Bled community, 
most notably Yao-Hua Tan, who co-authored over 12 publications in Bled involving trust 
from 1998 onwards, and René W. Wagenaar.  
3 Design stages for procedures driven by deontic structure 
The research we described in the previous section provided a way to automatically analyze 
the extent to which a given trade procedure had sufficient controls to remove the relevant 
risks for the parties involved. However, the creativity to derive new or improved procedures 
in changing circumstances was left up to the stakeholders or their representatives.  
In the meantime, re-engineering of trade procedures has become in urgent need and has 
attracted a great deal of interest from the international community. One key issue is the 
increased concern for security since 9/11. Traders are now subject to many more government 
controls, which increase administrative costs for trade. Studies show that trade procedures 
cost from 2 to 10% of traded value. Meanwhile, globalization makes the world economy 
depend on trade more than ever before. Since the year 2000, the world trade volume has 
grown twice as fast as the world output and has grown consistently with the exception of 
crisis year 2009. In 2011, world merchandise export exceeded $18 trillion (WTO, 2012). It is 
estimated that reducing the administrative costs of trade procedures could save around €300 
billion a year (Grainger, 2007). Thus, among governments and traders, there is a strong 
interest in the redesign of controls in international trade, especially given the aforementioned 
new possibilities offered by technologies such as (mobile) Internet, RFID tagging and so on. 
In 2005, the European Union committed to spend €1 billion every year on “aid for trade”, of 
which improving trade procedure is a major component. In the world, about $3 billion was 
spent on trade facilitation in 2004 (Grainger, 2007).  
A problem with technology motivated re-design is that there is a bias towards imitating the 
procedures used with the previous technology, for instance by simply replacing paper 
documents by their electronic equivalents. This may overlook the possibility that some 
controls are no longer needed in an electronic scheme. For instance, at the time when 
transferring funds between countries took several days, the seller often required a remittance 
certificate issued by the remitting bank to verify payment before delivering goods. Now, 
electronic fund transfers can be done within seconds. Instead of verifying payment from the 
remitting bank, the seller can check his own account. Consequently, getting a remittance 
certificate before delivery of goods is no longer required. Simultaneously, given the instant 
execution of the payment, the buyer has less opportunity to stop a payment if he discovers 
foul play along the way. 
Another factor is that some control requirements can be satisfied in several ways. Each way of 
enforcing controls may be appropriate to a specific situational context. If the designer only 
examines control solutions without considering the underlying control requirements, 
opportunities for improvement may be missed. 
Finally, most of the controls involve the exchange of “documents” in one way or another. As 
a consequence, the communication of those documents becomes a target in need of protection. 
In (Bons et al., 1997), the link was made between the performative function of a document 
and the technical requirement(s) of the communication, such as non-repudiation, 
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confidentiality, integrity and in special cases, uniqueness (or impossibility to copy). These 
requirements can be met using both procedural and technical measures, such as watermarks, 
stamps and holograms in case of paper, or public key infrastructure based encryption in case 
of electronic documents. Changing to e-business technologies, the issue is therefore not to 
exactly duplicate behaviors of paper documents by electronic means, but rather to capture the 
underlying functionality of the documents, which is about contracts, promises, licenses, 
rights, duties, privileges, etc. These concepts, together with their properties (e.g. negotiability 
and revocability), relations (e.g. conditional promises and mutual promises), and lifecycles 
(e.g. creation, transfer and discharge), define what technical control requirements are needed. 
We believe that the solution to this problem can be found by focusing at the underlying 
control targets, regardless of the technology and mechanisms chosen to implement the 
controls. Our focus is on the resulting procedural aspects and the role of information in the 
execution of trade transactions. Other researchers, like Gordijn and Tan, while departing from 
similar starting points, have a, in our view complementary, focus on the (quantitative) effects 
of the value exchange itself and the impact on the underlying business models (see for 
instance Gordijn & Tan, 2003).  
The notions of permissions, rights, obligations, prohibitions, waivers, etc. are collectively 
known as deontic concepts (Von Wright, 1951, 1968; Hilpinen 1971). These mark the 
contractual interest of each party in the behaviors of the other contracting parties. An 
obligation is what one party is expected to do, presumably for the benefit of another party. A 
prohibition (for instance, a confidentiality agreement), indicates how one party constrains the 
behavior of another.  A waiver is a release from some obligation (for instance, diplomatic 
immunity from parking tickets).  A permission (such as a license) allows a party to do 
something that would otherwise be prohibited. 
The focus here is thus on the adequacy of deontic controls in contracting (trade) procedures. 
These may involve the design of new procedures in some new problem domain, such as 
government contracting, or it may involve the re-design of existing procedures, for instance to 
incorporate electronic technologies. Our current challenge is to be able to generate new trade 
procedures based on a set of conditions in which the procedure is to operate (i.e., technical 
capabilities of parties involved, government regulations requiring or forbidding certain ways 
of working, etc.). While a documentary procedure changes with implemented contexts, its 
underlying “deontic” functionality – the way it changes the formal relationship among parties 
– does not. Any new procedure, regardless of its form, needs to provide controls for the same 
set of underlying deontic functions. In order to develop computational methods for this 
purpose, a formal representation of the deontic functions in the procedure is needed, as well as 
methods to systematically analyze the representation to identify control requirements.  
There are two ways to approach the deontic analysis of inter-organizational procedures. One 
way is to analyze the deontic effects at the level of an existing procedure, which already has 
various documentary and other kinds of controls embedded in it. Using this approach, one 
does a kind of reverse engineering, identifying the deontic relations, e.g. rights, duties, 
privileges, prohibitions, liabilities, etc. of the involved parties that are implicit in the various 
documentary exchanges and other actions (e.g. delivery of goods), for each of the steps in the 
procedure under analysis. The dissertation of Dewitz (1992) follows this approach. An 
alternative approach might be called 'start from basics'. In this approach, one designs the 
procedure first in terms of the basic „doing‟ tasks that are to be accomplished, and adds the 
„control tasks‟ later, based on the risks encountered.  
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The former case is perhaps better for analyzing procedures that have evolved over a long 
time. The latter is more useful in contexts where the situations are novel and/or urgent – such 
as for military conflict situations and humanitarian disaster response. Furthermore, the 
advantage of the „start from basics‟ approach is greater generality. The same deontic 
procedure may have various documentary procedure implementations, depending on the 
available technology. For instance, one version of the procedure may involve paper 
documents. Another version of the documentary procedure may utilize digital documents sent 
over a secure private network. Still another version of the procedure may utilize wireless 
infrastructure and mobile phones. 
The „start from basics‟ approach, as we envision it, consists of 5 distinct stages which we will 
describe and illustrate with a simple example. 
3.1 Stage 1: Specify basic terms and conditions of the contract 
The first step is to compile a declarative specification of the basic terms and conditions of the 
contract as formal logic specifications, independent of temporal ordering. The field of deontic 
modeling offers several alternative formalisms that can be used to model this (for instance, 
Tan & Thoen, 1998b, Tan et al. 2004). The purpose of this specification is to indicate the 
basic operational tasks that each of the parties is to perform in the contract, as well as 
constraints on the sequence in which they are to take place. These tasks may be physical, e.g. 
manufacture or transport, or they may also be deontic, for instance a particular activity is 
obligated, or an activity is specifically permitted, as with a license.  
To illustrate this we use a simple contract involving two parties, Seller and Buyer, who make 
two promises: one is the Buyer making a promise to the Seller to pay. The other is the Seller 
promising to the Buyer to make delivery once the seller has paid. (This tiny example 
obviously omits relevant details such as the price, the items to be delivered, and the deadlines 
for the actions.)  
[Buyer, Seller]: prepay_contract(Goods, Price) ==> 
A::Buyer to Seller: promise(Buyer to Seller: pay(Price));  
B::Seller to Buyer: promise(Seller: delivery(location(Buyer), Goods) / done(A)). 
READING: a prepay_contract between Buyer and Seller is made when (A) Buyer 
promises to Seller to pay a pre-agreed price and (B) when Seller promises to Buyer to 
deliver Goods to location of Buyer, conditional on Buyer having done (A). Seller 
commits to deliver the Goods to Buyer at his/her location. 
3.2 Stage 2: Derive deontic process model 
We introduced the “Documentary Petri Net formalism” in Lee & Bons (1995), to capture the 
exchange of goods, funds and information. The more explicit emphasis on deontic aspects has 
led us to adopt this formalism to facilitate these specifications, and to rename it “deontic petri 
nets”. The contract process model for this example is quite simple, as indicated by Figure 2. 
Essentially, there are two concurrent illocutionary actions in which each party makes its 
respective promise. These are followed by the sequence of the contract performance, where 
Buyer makes payment, followed by Seller doing delivery. 
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Figure 2: Process Model for Advance Payment Contract. 
3.3 Stage 3: Deriving control requirements from deontic proc. model 
Once the deontic process has been specified as a deontic petri net, the next stage of analysis is 
to identify control requirements, which indicate control objectives to be achieved by the 
documentary trade procedure.  Deriving control requirements requires the examination of all 
possible deontic changes in the process and the effects of such changes on the parties 
involved. Besides information provided by the deontic process model, this task may need 
additional information about the problem domain. Examples of such information are whether 
a party trusts the other, or whether parties are able to directly observe task performance by the 
other parties. 
This framework focuses on two fundamental aspects of a deontic procedure: deontic relations 
and deontic changes. In developing the rule base to identify control requirements, a taxonomy 
was established of all categories of deontic change of an obligation. This taxonomy includes 
the creation and termination of an obligation, as well as changes that take place in any 
constituents of the obligation. Analogously, a taxonomy of deontic relations was also created. 
This taxonomy includes unilateral obligations as well as the various contractual relationships 
between two parties. For each deontic change, a catalogue was made of all possible fraud 
potentials available to each party involved in the deontic relation, and the corresponding 
control requirements to limit these fraud potentials was identified (Nguyen, 2008). 
The various control requirements are classified into three categories: checking control, 
evidentiary control, and deontic control. Checking controls are checking activities performed 
by a party to make sure that a certain event has actually occurred. For example, in a 
documentary credit transaction, the confirming bank only checks the shipping documents 
against the specifications in the “Letter of Credit” to make sure that the goods were shipped 
before making payment2. Evidentiary controls involve the creation, exchange or cancellation 
of a document as evidence of an event. For example, when the seller delivers the goods to the 
carrier, the carrier issues a bill of lading to the seller as evidence of the delivery. Finally, the 
                                                 
2 In this procedure, the bank does not physically verify the shipment of goods but relies on documentary 
evidence only. For that reason, it is called a documentary credit; the credit part of the transaction being that the 
confirming bank pays the seller prior to receiving the money from the buyer. 
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kind of deontic control considered in this research involves a secondary promise from a 
trusted third party such as the promise from the issuing bank to the beneficiary of a 
documentary credit.   
Table 2 paraphrases the requirements generated from this analysis, paraphrased for 
readability. Control requirements are indicated by the keyword 'should' in the paraphrase. 
Note that, even for this simple contract, eleven control requirements were found! However, 
when control solutions are selected, multiple control requirements can often be combined in a 
single control solution, which will simplify the final trade procedure. 
3.4 Stage 4: Select control solutions 
A given control requirement may be satisfied by various control solutions. For instance, 
verification of a person's identity might be accomplished by presentation of a photo ID, such 
as a driver's license or passport, or it might be done by a more sophisticated biometric scan of 
the person's fingerprint or iris. The choice of control solution is based on an analysis of the 
risk of a control failure (either by willful deception or by accident) versus some estimate of 
the potential damage due to the failure (e.g. unauthorized admission to a concert vs. 
unauthorized admission to a nuclear reactor‟s control room). These aspects fall under the 
category of security engineering, of which there is a large literature. See for instance 
Anderson (2001), various works by Schneier (2003, 2008) and Lee et al. (2008) which 
discusses control solutions for transferable rights. 
Thus far, the focus has been on the generation of control requirements. We now briefly 
consider how these control requirements become satisfied by application of selected control 
solutions. In order to map from control requirements to control solutions, we utilize a rule 
format common in logic programming: 
 P if Q1 and Q2 and ... Qn. 
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 List of control requirements resulting from the analysis 
1&2 
Verify that after buyer promises to seller that buyer will pay, 
seller should check legal capacity of buyer and, 
seller should check buyer’s compliance with applicable regulations re. payments 
3&4 
After seller promises to buyer that seller will make delivery contingent on buyer’s 
payment, 
buyer should check legal capacity of seller and, 
buyer should check compliance with applicable regulations re. delivery, before buyer 
pays 
5 After seller promises to buyer that seller will deliver on condition that buyer has paid buyer should receive evidence from seller stating this promise 
6 After buyer has promised seller that buyer will pay seller should receive evidence from buyer stating this promise 
7 After buyer does pay buyer should receive evidence from seller that buyer has paid 
8 After seller does deliver seller should receive evidence that seller has delivered 
9 Before seller does deliver seller should verify that buyer has paid 
10 After seller has delivered buyer should verify that seller has delivered 
11 After buyer has paid seller should verify that buyer has done payment 
Table 2: Control Requirements for Advance Payment Contract.  
 
For example, in the two instances of Control Rules 5 and 6 from Table 2, the control 
requirement is that each party should receive evidence of the promise of the other. For many 
routine transactions, this is done by means of a purchase order document followed by some 
kind of order confirmation. In legal terms, the purchase order is a contractual offer, and the 
confirmation is an acceptance. But note that even in this simple case, two documentary steps 
are required for the creation of the promise. For instance, the control requirement for the seller 
is the following 
seller from buyer:  
receive_evidence(done(buyer to seller: promise(buyer : pay)))) 
That is, the seller needs to receive evidence from the buyer about the buyer's promise to pay. 
Rules used to derive a documentary control solution rule might look like the following: 
has_evidence(X, PromisedAction) if 
 has_evidence(X, Contract) and 
 implies(Contract, PromisedAction). 
 
has_evidence(Z, contract(X,Y, ContractTerms) if 
 has_evidence(Z, (X to Y: offer(ContractTerms)) and 
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 has_evidence(Z, (Y to X: accept(ContractTerms)) and 
 (X to Y: offer(ContractTerms)) < (Y to X: accept(ContractTerms)). 
 
has_evidence(Z, (X to Y: offer(ContractTerms)) if 
 X to Y: purchase_order(ContractTerms). 
 
has_evidence(Z, (Y to X: accept(ContractTerms)) if 
 Y to X: confirm_order(ContractTerms). 
 
Thus, according to the first rule, one way to get evidence for a promised action is to get 
evidence for a contract, which includes ('implies') the promised action. The second rule says 
that a way to have evidence for a contract is to have evidence for an offer followed by an 
acceptance. The final two rules say that a purchase order is evidence of an offer, and an order 
confirmation is evidence for an acceptance. Note that there may be other ways to evidence a 
promise or a contact, which would require additional rules. It should be emphasized that this 
step, selection of control solutions, is the stage that is most dependent on the contracting 
domain and is further most likely to change as new technologies become available. Thus, the 
rules presented here are only illustrative.  
3.5 Integrate control solutions to generate role procedures 
Various control requirements involve the transfer of evidence that a certain action has been 
done, e.g. signing a receipt for delivery. Such evidentiary control requirements can usually be 
inserted as a single localized step in the procedure. More challenging are control requirements 
that require a check or comparison to some state created earlier in the procedure. For instance, 
a claim to refill one's prescription at the pharmacy requires a prior registration of a 
prescription order from an authorized doctor. The various selected control solutions create a 
set of additional (control) tasks that add to, or in some cases replace, the original set of 
contractual (doing) tasks. The final step is to assemble this augmented set of tasks into an 
integrated procedure.  
The approach we take to analysis of procedures is an adaptation of model checking. Model 
checking is used to determine if and how a program might arrive at a certain critical state that 
can cause the system to crash. The system and the specified state are formulated using a form 
of temporal logic. One popular representation is computational tree logic (CTL), which is the 
representation used here. The essence of the problem is to determine if the specified condition 
is satisfiable within the axioms that describe the system. 
As with other kinds of modal logic theorem provers, a problem for model checkers is a 
combinatorial explosion of the state space. However, recent developments in model checking 
have made these techniques computationally more tractable (Clarke et al., 1999). In the 
approach described in this paper, a logic programming based CTL model checker is used, 
which is adapted from the version presented in Leuschel and Massart (2000). Essentially, the 
technique involves converting the petri net form to a state-transition graph, and then matching 
the control patterns to this transition graph. In our case, this involves an application of AI 
planning techniques called procedure constraint grammar (Lee, 2001b), which essentially 
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resolves the ordering constraints on the combined set of doing and control tasks. As explained 
in (Lee, 1999), the procedures are divided by role, and all coordination is performed by 
communication of documents. It is important to note that the architecture needs to permit the 
downloading and autonomous execution of each role procedure by the respective parties.  
4 Concluding remarks and future research directions 
Trust has been recognized as a key factor in the adoption of e-Business solutions by the Bled 
Conference over the years. Over 60 contributions have been published between 1994 and 
2011, which we categorized into the fundamentals of trust, the role trust plays in the adoption 
of business-to-business, business-to-consumer and currently Social Media applications and, 
finally, ways to overcome a lack of trust by implementing controls. While the peak of 
publications appears to have taken place in the beginning of the 2000s and attention seems to 
have since shifted to other areas, “Trust” deserves a continuous point on the agenda, 
especially at conferences such as Bled where the scientific community, the business 
community and governmental agencies, especially the EU, meet to discuss new ways of 
working in commerce, healthcare and government. With cybercrime at an all time high, 
Social Media being increasingly confronted with serious incidents involving (anonymous) 
participants and a general increase of fear, uncertainty and doubt in traditional (financial) 
institutions, “trustworthiness” is a topic in need of continual re-evaluation. 
Over the years we have been proud members of the Bled community and have contributed to 
one specific area of “Trust”: enabling electronic commerce in situations where the level of 
partner trust is (still) not high enough and alternative control procedures need to be 
implemented. In the paper we discussed our key contributions to Bled in the 1990s, focusing 
on the ability to automatically analyze whether or not a trade procedure provides sufficient 
controls to the parties involved, based on a set of general design principles.  
We have concluded this paper with the next step and focus on the design and generation 
process of secure procedures and consequently the generation of control requirements. 
Starting from the core of the trade procedure, the set of obligations that parties have towards 
each other, a modeling perspective called deontic process modeling was introduced to 
represent the entire life cycle of deontic relations. A formal representation, “deontic petri 
nets”, has been developed to support the modeling and analysis of practical applications. This 
formalism comprises two components: (1) a logic component, which combines aspects of 
deontic logic, temporal logic, action logic, and institutionalized power logic for modeling 
deontic states and deontic changes, and (2) a Petri net component for graphical representation, 
analysis and simulation. These two components are integrated in a single semantic framework 
based on state transition systems. 
With this effort, we have hoped to show that the issue of trust and control is as vivid as it has 
been and that with the help of AI based tools we can facilitate the continuous adoption of 
business practices (“trade procedures”) to accommodate new circumstances, most particularly 
the evolution of EDI into e- and now m-commerce and social media. We believe that two 
topics are of specific interest for future research: responsive controls, and harmonizing 
controls. 
Responsive controls are control procedures that are able to actively respond to changes in 
business and legal environment. Inter-organizational transactions typically span many 
countries, and may involve different trade alliances. Countries and trade alliances impose 
various regulatory control requirements on trade procedures. These requirements involve a 
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wide range of issues, including tax collection, environmental protection, health protection, 
human right protection, fair trade protection, and security protection. Regulatory control 
requirements are frequently changed, since a country or a trade alliance may adjust its 
regulations for political and economic purposes. Moreover, a country may enter or withdraw 
from a trade alliance. Changes in regulatory controls could affect trading products, trading 
countries, trading parties, etc. A challenge for future research is to design control procedures 
that would enable straightforward and rapid adaptation to such changes. 
Issues for harmonization of controls in trade procedures have been discussed by Lee and 
Dominguez (2004). The harmonization problem arises due to differences in regulatory control 
requirements among administrations governing a transaction. Different countries have 
different requirements on particular kinds of transactions. Given that the countries are willing 
to harmonize their differences in their respective trade procedures, how to should one go 
about designing a system that could facilitate this process? Ideally, such a system would 
provide features for detecting control weaknesses and possible conflicting requirements, 
providing negotiation support to resolve control deficiencies and, if there are and conflicts, 
providing decision support in identifying control solutions that provide inter-operability 
among the parties, and helping to incorporate these control solutions into a the final 
procedure. Given a transaction scenario, the process of harmonization could start with 
gathering regulatory control requirements of all involved governmental administrations and 
other parties. A system would need to be developed to detect conflicting requirements. These 
conflicts could be resource conflicts (e.g. a party unable to comply with two different 
requirements within a certain limitation of resource) or procedural conflicts (one 
administration requires step A before step B, while another administration requires step B 
before step A). All detected conflicting requirements would be identified as issues for 
negotiation, for instance to be resolved by UN trade committees.  
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